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Islamisation continued more gradually after the coming of the Portuguese and Dutch. 4 Cooley has observed that the advent of Islam resulted in changes in the local culture. In the indigenous marriage system, for instance, the required dowry was a human head as a symbol of individual prowess. This was later altered to rings, jewelry and other items prescribed under Islamic law. 5 Islamisation was challenged by the Christianisation of Malukan communities by the Portuguese when they held sway in the islands, from 1512 to 1605. The Portuguese first brought Catholicism to Northern Maluku, but encountered strong resistance from the Muslims there. They subsequently succeeded in Christianising elites in Central Maluku, where there was less resistance due to the fact that the region had not been fully Islamised.
When the Portuguese first arrived in Maluku, the Muslim sultans welcomed them and the trade they brought. However, armed clashes soon broke out between the Muslims on the one hand, and the Portuguese and, later their local Christian converts, on the other, over economic and religious issues. 6 Lestaluhu has detailed the history of these clashes. 7 The first was the Hitu War (1520-1605) between Malukan Muslims and Portuguese and Malukan Christians. The Muslim-Christian clashes continued until the coming of the Dutch in 1605. Soon after the Dutch arrival, some 16,000 Ambonese were baptised in the Leitimor and Lease islands in 1605. 8 The Dutch were to stay on for more than three hundred years until 1942. The Dutch colonial government brought the Protestant religion, which made significant inroads into the central part of Maluku. This was aided by the fact that Dutch policy favored -----------------4 F.L. Cooley, "Persentuhan Kebudayaan di Maluku Tengah 1475-1675", in Paramita R. Abdurrachman, R.Z. Leirissa and C.P.F. Luhulima (eds) , Bunga Rampai Sejarah Maluku (1), (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian Sejarah Maluku, 1973), p. 120. 5 Ibid., p. 121. 6 Leirissa, Maluku. 7 Maryam RL. Lestaluhu, Sejarah Perlawanan Masyarakat Islam terhadap Imperialisme di Daerah Maluku, (Bandung: PT Al Maarif, 1988) . 8 Richard Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatist, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1990), p. 18. Christians in gaining access to education and lower administrative positions in the colonial government. Chauvel described the discriminatory policy of the Dutch government toward Muslims as follows:
After some hesitation, and the request from the Christian village leaders from Leitimor in 1607, the VOC [Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, Dutch East India Company] adopted the policy that Christianity was seen as a means to promote the loyalty of the population to the Christian rulers. The VOC also attempted, with limited success, to curb the process of Islamisation. Together with the destruction of the Ambonese Islamic 'states' and the elimination of the Moslem elite as independent political actors, this meant that the Moslem community was relegated to a subordinate position in colonial society compared with their Christian compatriots. 9 However, they could not have foreseen the long-term consequences of this type of policy. It resulted in the division of the local community along religious lines and laid the basis for the conflict between Muslims and Christians that has continued to the presentday.
C. The Rise of the Jihad Movement in Indonesia
In a tabligh akbar (mass religious meeting) of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah (FKAWJ, or Sunni Communication Forum) in Solo, Central Java, on 14 February 1999, about a month after the Ambon conflict broke out, its leader, Ja'far Umar Thalib, stated that:
Muslims must be alert to the threat from Muslims' foes and the separatists, who tend to tyrannise the Muslim religious minority. Muslims have an obligation to get behind an Islamic government, which is headed by a pious Muslim man. If the kafir (infidel) is to lead the government, based on the fatwa (guidance) of Syaikh bin Baz [Syaikh Abdulaziz Bin Baz], Muslims will have to battle against him/ her. 10 Thalib's perspective here was clearly biased against the Christians, as he gave a one-sided elucidation of the teachings of the Salafy Arab -----------------9 Ibid, p. 20. 10 "Apel Siaga Umat Islam", Salafy, No. 30, 1999 (44) .
cleric, Syaikh Abdulaziz Bin Baz 11 (d. 13 May 1999) , a Grand Mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Head of the Council of Ulama in Saudi Arabia. For Thalib, Syaikh Abdulaziz was one of the most outstanding figures, not only as a Salafy religious teacher, but also someone with the international political connections that would help further Thalib's own agenda in Indonesia. The Salafy (or Salafi) represent a reformed Islamic ideology in search of Islamic purification by returning to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The Salafyst (reformist) thinkers base their teaching on that of Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (d. 1896), Abu al-Ala Maududi (1903 Maududi ( -1949 , and the leader of the Muslim Brothers, Hasan al-Banna (1906 -1964 .
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To understand the developments of the Jihad movement in Indonesia, it is important to examine Thalib's background and that of the FKAWJ. Thalib was born on 29 December 1961 in an Arab family at Malang, East Java. Thalib's father was an advocate of the al-Irsyad movement, an organization of the sayyid community during the colonial period. After graduating from the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (LIPIA) Jakarta, a higher institute sponsored by the government of Saudi Arabia, Thalib went to the Maududi Islamic Institute in Pakistan, under the sponsorship of the DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia), a missionary organization established by Muhammad Natsir (d. 1993) in 1967. Whilst in Pakistan, Thalib was involved with the Afghan mujahidin in their Jihad or holy war against the Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and spent the 1980s battling to control the country. As a volunteer fighter, Thalib was attached to one of the factions led by an Afghan assistant professor of theology who graduated from
11 Syaikh (or Sheikh) Abdulaziz Bin Baz had been a leading figure in the Saudi Arabian government for about fifty years. He came to prominence as a judge of the AlKharj region in the 1950s and ultimately rose to the highest position among Muslim scholars in Arabia with influence over the Muslim world. He became the Grand Mufti, who was responsible for giving religious decrees on certain issues from family problems to politics until his death in 1999. See the website set up in appreciation of Bin Baz's fatawa (religious decrees) and his life Baz (1912 Baz ( -1999 and Rabi' ibn Hadi 'Umar al-Madkhali) were prominent figures giving fatwa (guidance) in support of the tabligh akbar and later the Jihad in Indonesia, covering an assortment of issues from politics to war against Christians.
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Returning from Yemen, Thalib established a pesantren and a Salafy community called the Jama'ah Ihya al-Sunnah (the Community to Establish the Prophet's Teachings) in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta in 1994. He recruited students from secular universities and based his teachings 17 The FKAWJ's members were mostly low-income earners, university students or Muslims who had been laid-off as a result of the financial and economic crises of 1997-8. The FKAWJ grew very rapidly in a very short time. It established twelve pesantrens throughout Indonesia, each with memberships of around forty thousand people. These later formed the core components of the militia organization, the Laskar Jihad.
Apart from deep alienation over the financial and economic crises, Thalib also benefited from the debates surrounding national politics, in the period between the formation of the FKAWJ at the tabligh akbar in Solo in February 1999 and the declaration of the Laskar Jihad at another tabligh akbar in January 2000 in Yogyakarta. During this period, the FKAWJ, along with other Muslim activists and organizations, not only had called for a Jihad to Ambon, but also professed that it was Habibie was the only candidate who had Islamic views, in contrast with Wahid (PKB) … and Megawati (PDI-P) who were secular party leaders, who competed to assure salibis (Crusaders), Zionists and Chinese conglomerates that they were able to devote themselves to the purpose of stopping the dangers of the Islamic sectarians.
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Thalib not only backed Habibie in his presidential candidature with the support of a religious fatwa from Wahhabi religious teachers from Arabia, but also argued that the Ambon conflict had also led to a general condemnation of the Indonesian military forces and of the government's performance due to their perceived failure to protect Muslims against alleged ethnic cleansing by Christians. After the formation of the Wahid government, Thalib claimed that it was the right time for Muslims to fight against not only the Christians in Maluku and also against Wahid's government.
On 30 January 2000, the FKAWJ had their second tabligh akbar in Kridosono, Yogyakarta and declared their Jihad in Maluku. According to Thalib, 'The tabligh akbar's Jihad declaration was a response to the arrogance of President Abdurrahman Wahid in disregarding the cry of Malukan Muslims who were hurting as a consequence of the horrible The Laskar Jihad also invited Indonesian Muslims to join the Jihad to Maluku. They opened Jihad recruitment offices in the major cities in Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi, and also sought financial support from individual Muslims in mosques, markets, restaurants, streets and, more significantly, from high profile national figures and conglomerates which used to be close to the discredited Suharto regime.
20 During their Jihad operation, the Laskar Jihad claimed to have received financial support from many ordinary people, including individual donations from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Europe, the USA and Australia, 21 and, from Muslim political parties in Libya, the Philippines, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 22 However, there was little transparency as to the identity of these donors, or how they were used to finance the activities of the Laskar Jihad. 23 Interview with a FKAWJ staff member, Dogelan, Yogyakarta, early September 2002. Besides, the sources of the overseas donations were difficult to track down after the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 attack, after which tight restrictions were put in place to prevent support for terrorism in South and Southeast Asia. An interview with a FKAWJ staff member, Dogelan, Yogyakarta, early September 2002.
-----------------
The Laskar Jihad recruited many unemployed Muslims, mostly from Java, South Sulawesi, Sumatra and Kalimantan, a number of university students, a few university graduates from secular universities, some veterans of the Afghanistan war and a small number from Islamic universities. Although the Wahid government opposed the rally, elements in the Indonesian security forces supported it. Jakarta police officer, Lt. Col. (Police) Said Agil, confirmed the involvement of security forces and argued that this rally was therefore better organized and orderly compared to other rallies. 25 Elements in the political elite, in particular those involved in the Poros Tengah (Central Axis) alliance of Muslim political parties, who were disappointed with Wahid government's policies and its lukewarm support for the implementation of Muslim law, also supported the rally.
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The Poros Tengah caucus was initiated by Amin Rais of PAN, and other Islamic political parties, such as PPP, PBB, Partai Keadilan (PK) and Partai Nahdlatul Ummat (PNU), which collectively only received a small percentage of the vote in the 1999 elections. They wanted to unite in order to increase their political bargaining power against the However, they were soon to be disappointed. Wahid as president failed to accommodate the various Muslim factions. Differences soon led to the departure of the representatives of Muslim parties from his cabinet. Thus, the tabligh akbar in Jakarta represented various disaffected Muslim interests and was organized to challenge the Wahid government. The momentum of the Jihad movement, with the evident significant political support from Jakarta elites, resulted in an increase in the confidence of local Ambonese Muslims. This in turn led to the Christians responding by seeking national as well as international intervention in the conflict.
The following section examines the roles of the various actors in the conflict, namely the national security forces, the Muslims, the Christians, NGOs and local government, and finally, the central government.
D. The Response of the National Security Forces
During the first phase of the conflict, the Christians held the upper hand. During this phase, Muslims sought the support of their Muslim brethren in Java and other parts of Indonesia, holding numerous Muslim rallies to declare the importance of a holy war against the Christians. As a result of the support of the Laskar Jihad, the Muslims were able, during the later stages of the conflict, to reverse their fortunes and gain the upper hand, regaining the Muslim areas that the Christians had taken during the initial phase of the conflict.
This later phase began in May 2000, after the Laskar Jihad came to Ambon with its first group of 3,000 members, equipped with standard military weapons. 27 The Laskar Jihad shifted the pattern of 30 By 27 June, President Wahid was moved to announce a Civil Emergency. 31 The Pattimura commander-in-chief was shifted from Max Tamaela to I Made Yasa. In response to international criticism and pressure, the security forces then attempted to counter the Muslim domination of the conflict by deploying Yon Gabungan (special alliance forces), which consisted of special forces commandoes drawn from the military and the police. The special forces began duties on 22 September 2000, and proceeded to attack Laskar Jihad bases in Ambon, resulting in the deaths of a number of Muslims. 34 The Soya is a mountainous region, about three hours walking distance from Ambon city. It was difficult for ordinary people to be involved in an attack on such a region. The victims, who survived this incident, came to the conclusion that members of the Special Armed Forces in cooperation with Laskar Jihad paramilitary groups were involved in the attack. They listened to the attackers' Javanese accents and observed their obvious military skills (An interviw with Johanes, Ambon, 2 August 2002). Before the incident, the Laskar Jihad seemed to have been coordinating their own attack agenda in consultation with members of the Special Armed Forces and other security groups, without involving ordinary Ambonese Muslims (An interview with Abdulgani Fabanyo, Ambon, 18 August 2002). 35 The bomb went off just a few hundred metres away from where I was standing when interviewing Christians near the Citra supermarket. Christians screamed 'Acang…Acang (Muslims…Muslims!…)'. Christians were alleging that Muslims had planted this bomb. I saw a group of Special Armed Forces personnel save a person athletes died in the vicinity of the Mardika Court. In these incidents, both Muslims and Christians realised that there were outside actors involved in trying to prolong the conflict.
----------------

E. The Response of the Local Muslims
The arrival of the Laskar Jihad resulted in the division of local Muslims into two groups: local radical groups, which inherited the religious radicalism of the Laskar Jihad, and the dominant moderate Muslim group, which to some extent was opposed to the mission of the Laskar Jihad and was prepared to cooperate with the government in seeking a peaceful solution. These factions had an impact on the dynamics of inter-Muslim relationships and on inter-faith and interethnic reconciliation.
The first impact of the coming of the Laskar Jihad was a growth in Islamic radicalism among local Ambonese Muslims. There were two main radical organisations in Ambon. 36 Ustaz Dzulqarnain, a leading teacher in the FKAWJ, stated that Muslims had a requirement before attacking and killing Christians: it was compulsory to teach Christians and persuade them to convert to Islam and it was -----------------(alleged to be Muslim) by using an Acang (Muslim) public car. However, Christians then realised that this person was a police intelligence officer, who operated in the Mardika market area (Ambon, a fieldwork note, 28 July 2002). 36 An interview with Irwan Patty, Ambon, 10 August 2002.
forbidden to kill women and children. 37 Such teaching concerning war changed the nature of the local Muslims' religiosity. They gained a confidence and belief that attacking and killing Christians was legal under Islamic law. The surprising success of the Malino II peace agreement demonstrated that local Ambonese Muslims had supported the Laskar Jihad in order to secure their lives against the perceived threat of the Christians and the separatist RMS. However, the violent activities of the Laskar Jihad had also become an embarrassment to Indonesia. Hours before the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002, the Laskar Jihad was officially disbanded in Jakarta. According to its legal adviser, this was due to internal divisions over policy and ideology, in particular, Thalib's approach to waging Jihad. Its parent organization, the FKAWJ, has continued to carry out its social and educational activities on Java. 40 In Maluku, the Laskar Jihad warriors thus returned to Java after the disbandment. Without this interference from the radical organization, local Ambonese Muslims were able to find release from their fears and burdens by working towards reconciliation with their Christian counterparts.
F. The Response of Christians
The response of the Christian community gathered pace from early 2000 onwards, especially after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad in Maluku. Early on, Muslims perceived the Jihad to be against Christians who had attacked Muslims. A few months after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad, however, the focus of the Jihad or holy war changed from one against Christians to one against the separatist RMS (Republic of South Maluku) movement. Muslims assumed that the separatist agenda had support in the wider Christian community. However, many Christians in fact did not support this, viewing the Maluku Sovereign Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku or FKM) led by Alex Manuputty as being one of those responsible for inflaming sentiments between the Christian and Muslim communities.
When the FKM was first founded, it did attract significant support from Christians, who saw it as a moral movement criticising the central government, which had failed to solve the conflict. After the arrival of the Laskar Jihad, the Christians felt compelled to seek international intervention to solve the ongoing conflict. In August 2000, therefore, Alex Manuputty campaigned against human rights violations in Maluku by appealing to the United States. 41 After returning from the USA, however, Manuputty's approach became more political. He opposed the central government by asserting that Maluku ought to be separated from Indonesia, on the grounds that Maluku was illegally taken over by the Sukarno government in the 1950s. conflict more severe in 2000 than it was in 1999. There were groups that played an important role in the growth of this fundamentalism, in particular, those who had played key roles in defending the Christians against Muslims in 2000. Agus Watimena, the leader of the Coker (Cowok-Cowok Kristen, Christian Boys), 43 a gang based in Kudamati claimed that: 'this is a real religious war and we have to protect ourselves. Sometimes protection means attacking first. We have a plan, and when the time comes, we will wipe them out'. 44 The growth of such extremist groups however, merely exacerbated the conflict.
The Christian Laskar Kristus paramilitary group was formed during the early stages of the conflict, but this movement gained significant momentum after the destruction of the Silo church, the oldest church in Ambon, on December 1999. Agus Wattimena led the paramilitaries until his death on 22 March 2001, after which Emang Nikijuluw, Semmy Souissa and Melkianus Yusuf Tuhumury led the militia groups. The Christian groups consisted of 25 small divisions of 100-200 militant members in the city of Ambon and in the neighbouring islands. 60 per cent of members were estimated to be between 12 and 25 years old, with a few women members. 45 They used traditional arms such as knives, machetes, poisoned arrows, homemade guns and small numbers of automatic weapons obtained from corrupt police.
46
G. The Response of the NGOs and Local Government
There have been attempts at reconciliation since the early stages of the conflict in Ambon. They have some common features: both local and central governments have made on-going attempts to initiate reconciliation with the involvement of both civil leaders and military officers. There have been the grassroots-level involvements of local, Conflict, Jihad, and Religious Identity in Maluku, Eastern Indonesia national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as attempts by Ambonese themselves to resolve the situation in their local communities. These features can be divided into two patterns: top-down and bottom-up initiatives -each with their strengths and weaknesses. This essay argues that in the case of reconciliation in Ambon, neither the government nor the NGOs on their own have been successful. Both are needed.
The first local government initiative toward reconciliation involved the formation of the 'Team Six' (Tim Enam). It was formed at the end of January 1999 and was given the task of investigating the January 1999 conflict and seeking ways to resolve the issues arising from it. It comprised both Muslim and Christian representatives: Thamrin Elly, Luthfy Sanaky, John Ruhulesin, M.G. Lailosa, Bruno Rumyaru, and Condratus Ufie. 47 With the escalation of conflict, it was found necessary to expand this group to make it more representative and include local bureaucrats, religious leaders, military leaders, adat chiefs and others in the local elite.
This new team was given the name Pusat Rujuk Social (PRS, the Social Reconciliation Centre). In its early stages, the team was able to successfully look after mosques, churches and other places where there was potential for violence. It set about analysing the roots of the conflict, formulating a reconciliation process, creating suburban security patrol posts, consolidating management of negeri-negeri (village areas) and ran seminars and workshops discussing the roots of conflict.
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The PRS initiated a reconciliation treaty at the Merdeka Square, Ambon on 12 May 1999. Religious leaders, heads of the local communities, youth leaders and other grassroots Muslims and Christians, signed the agreement. 49 However, this agreement was a top- Keluar dari Kemelut Maluku, p. 136. 48 Ibid., p. 137. 49 The pact was signed by R.R. Hasanusi (MUI chief), Pdt. S.P. Titaley (the chief of Sinode GPM, Protestant Church), Mgr. Joseph Tethol (Uskup Dioses Amboina, Catholic Church), Hussein Tuasikal (Remaja Masjid, chief of Mosque Youth), Ferry Nahusona (Angkatan Muda GPM, GPM Youth), FR Simon P Matruty (Catholic Youth ), RE Latuconsina (Latupati (head) of sub-district (kecamatan) of Saparua islands), AL Loilosa down agreement, which was not understood by the grassroots, who were largely concerned for their safety and that of their communities. The team ceased to exist after the second period of the conflict began in July 1999. It was seen by the grassroots as a government body, which was unable to effectively probe the roots of the conflict because of its top-down approach. The Muslim and Christian communities felt they could not rely on this approach.
The next government initiative was the 'Team Twenty-four', which was initially formed to ensure the protection of President Wahid and his Cabinet during their visit to Ambon in December 1999. It began by distributing some thirty thousand pamphlets to communities in both Muslim and Christian regions, dropping them by army helicopter on 7 December 1999. These pamphlets outlined the Deklarasi Menahan Diri (Restrain Oneself Declaration), which stated:
Towards the coming holy month of Ramadhan and Idul Fitri 1 Syawal 1420 H., Christmas (25 December 1999) and New Year 2000, people are expected to refrain from activities, which might instigate violence. Therefore, people are not to hold mass gatherings, nor to fabricate irresponsible rumours … nor to shoot, bomb or other similar activities, which would stir up mass feelings … and to immediately form security patrol posts (Indo. Pos Keamanan Masyarakat) in each neighbourhood [to calm the local population, give them a sense of security and a sense of their participation in ensuring their security].
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The statement was intended to calm the emotions of both communities before the arrival of President Wahid and Vice-President Megawati on 12 December 1999. However, the temporary peace prevailed until 19 December 1999 when conflict again broke out in Kampung Java, Ambon. Four people were killed and eight were seriously injured. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both at a local and national level, played a pivotal role in reconciliation attempts. The growth in the number of NGOs was enormous, from under fifty before the conflict to more than four hundred during the conflict. 51 This growth can be seen as a consequence of a growth in civil society activity in Ambon during the conflict. The NGOs saw reconciliation as a longterm process. Two examples of successful NGO outcomes were the Wayame regional self-protection units and the TIRUS (Tim Relawan Untuk Kemanusiaan, The Voluntary Teams for Humanity) initiated by 12 NGOs. However, the NGOs were not able to make contact with the radical Muslim and Christian groups, which were involved in mobilising the communities for battle.
The religious and social leaders of the village of Wayame took the initiative in forming the 'Team Twenty of Wayame'. It was founded in February 1999 to protect the region of Wayame from attack and from influences stemming from conflict in other regions. The team successfully protected their community (Muslims and Christians) from outside influence. The Wayame team conducted intensive dialogue, prayers for peace and encouraged respect for each other, assisted both the Muslim and Christian communities. From this experience, it can in fact be concluded that the Ambon conflict was not purely a religious conflict, but was instigated by outsiders.
52 However, the team continued to function only until May 2000 when outsiders mounted a full attack on Wayame. Latuconsina released a statement announcing the formation of reconciliation teams among villages all over the Ambonese islands. These teams had the job of implementing a program of reconciliation, which was to function at the village level.
54 These local government approaches, however, were ineffective because of a dispute between the civil government and the security and police forces as to who was really in charge during the civil emergency after June 2000.
H. Response of the Central Government
In addition, the central government also undertook a number of initiatives. President Wahid gave to Vice-President Megawati the task of coordinating the efforts of the Coordinating Ministers from the Ministry of Politics and Security, Ministry of Religious Affairs, and Ministry for Social Welfare and Poverty Eradication in initiating a longterm program for reconciliation from January 2000. However, this central government initiative, though ambitious, ran into problems because of the difficulty in getting the executive members to work with each other. This was the result of friction between the VicePresident and President and between other leading figures in the central government.
Under President Megawati's leadership, the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, Jusuf Kalla, played a mediating role at a meeting between opposing Christian and Muslim factions in Malino, South (2) to abide by the due process of law which is to be enforced fairly (3) to reject and oppose all kinds of separatist movements, including aspirations for a Republic of South Maluku (RMS) (4) the people of Maluku would have the right to stay and work legally anywhere in the Republic of Indonesia, so long as they respected the local culture, and observed law and order, (5) to ban and disarm illegal armed organizations, groups, or militias, in accordance with the existing law; outsider parties that disturb the peace in Maluku will be expelled from Maluku, (6) to establish a national independent investigation team to investigate, for example, the tragic incident on 19 January 1999, and the involvement of Maluku Sovereign Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku-FKM) 
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Radical Muslim groups argued that the Malino II declaration was one-sided, as it did not involve them in the process of reconciliation. They argued that Muslims at the meeting were not representative of Malukan Muslims and that there were some Christians in the meeting, whom they claim were involved in separatist activities and the mass killing of Malukan Muslims during the early stages of the conflict.
56
According to Pariela, the head of Christian delegation at Malino II, the radical Muslim groups had in fact been invited, but these groups had said that they would only join the meeting if all kapitan (leaders)
Tamrin Amal Tomagola, Seminar on the Moluccan Communal Conflict, a working paper for Indonesia Study Group, Canberra, the Australian National University, 12 July 2002. 56 An interview with Ustaz Muhammad At-Tamimy, Ambon, August 2002. At-Tamimy becomes a rector of State Islamic University few years after conflict, and has facilitated religious dialogues through his university. of the Muslim security patrol posts (about a hundred people) were involved in the meeting and if they were able to screen members of the Christian delegation to exclude RMS activists. Pariela's view was that this was an irrational approach to take as part of a process of working towards reconciliation.
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The Malino II agreement became the key to further reconciliation steps in Ambon covering the broader issues. The agreement sparked a process not just in terms of dialogue but also in the search for political and economic solutions acceptable to both communities. NGOs came to have a prominent role in this reconciliation process, helping not just as a bridge between the Muslim and Christian communities but also acting as a bridge between the government and the local community.
The NGOs were able to reach a broad cross-section of people, from ordinary citizens to those who had actually participated in the violence. In the Muslim regions, the Malukan branch of the Lakpesdam NU (Lembaga Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia Nahdlatul Ulama, the NU Institute for Human Resources Development), an NGO under the biggest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, played a significant role in accommodating the views of grassroots Muslims in reaching a peaceful solution. The Lakpesdam NU made available psychological treatment for young local Muslims, who had been directly involved in the war against Christians, and facilitated dialogue between them and their Christian counterparts.
I. Jihad After 9/11 and Future Challenges
As described above, Laskar Jihad forces returned to Java and disbanded shortly after the Bali bombing in October 2002. After that, a general stability descended upon Maluku, although systematic violence has continued, with a number of unexplained killings.
This has been attributed to the Laskar Mujahidin, a radical Muslim network that is the product of the radicalisation of local Muslims as a result of the activities of radical activists from outside Maluku. The network comprises of Mujahidin Kompak (consisting of those discontented with the Malino II accord), former members of the Darul ----------------- 57 An interview with Tony Pariela, Ambon, 31 July 2002.
Islam (supporters of the idea of an Indonesian Islamic State) and the Al Qaeda-linked Jama'ah Islamiah group active in Maluku and Poso. 58 The group has attacked government forces, such as the operation against the police camp in Loki on 16 May 2005, which killed five police, a Loki Christian, and also led to the deaths of two Laskar Mujahidin members. More than fifteen Mujahidin members were later jailed for the attacks. 59 The association with the Jema'ah Islamiah and such violent activities against the state indicate that the network is linked to the problem of wider regional terrorism.
Laskar Mujahidin was founded soon after the early MuslimChristian clash in Maluku in 1999. The Muslim organization in Java, the Dewan Dakwah Islamiah Indonesia, had mobilised groups to support Muslims from the threat of the Christians. This group then became the KOMPAK Foundation, which initially undertook humanitarian operation in Maluku and Poso beginning in 1999. This evolved into the Laskar Mujahidin, which, like the Laskar Jihad, took part in combat operations in Maluku. Unlike the latter, however, Laskar Mujahidin prefers to move and attack in small groups, comprising about 10-15 people. According to Ambonese Muslims, Mujahidin forces were more strategically placed and had a greater impact compared to Laskar Jihad forces 60 The Laskar Mujahidin network in Maluku has operations at the district level. Each district level post is chaired by a local commander, except in Air Kuning where Ustaz Arsyad, a Javanese graduated from Al-Mukmin Ngruki in 2001, became a commander in Maluku in [2004] [2005] . The group has a systematic mode of operation, with planners, financial supporters and executors.
The continued presence of such radicalized groups and individuals, coupled with the bitterness generated by the conflict, indicate the potential for the Maluku conflict to emerge again at some point in the future.
Government, civil society and security forces have continued their attempts at peace building in Maluku under the financial support of national and international agencies. Coser has optimistically argued that the contending parties of the conflict will reduce their activities after reaching a collective accord of peace and development. 61 In Maluku, each ethno-religious group is aware of the need for unity in ensuring Malukan development.
However, there remain serious challenges, such as the plight of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the threat of Laskar Mujahidin forces. In 2005, several thousands of IDPs were still staying in emergency barracks, as emergency funds were siphoned off by a few corrupt government officers. The situation is mirrored in the plight of the IDPs in Poso, Central Sulawesi. security cooperation not only in Indonesia but also internationally through the ASEAN and Asia Pacific security networks.
This essay has argued that the impact of the Laskar Jihad militia group has been prominent, and that outside forces were responsible in large part for the scale and sustenance of the violence in Maluku. The local community, both Muslim and Christian, largely prefer to negotiate their differences in a peaceful manner, but the Laskar Jihad has unfortunately left a legacy of local radicalized groups that will continue to pose a serious security challenge for some time to come.
